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Abstract. To what extent does Islam help explain the dynamics of a participatory civil 
society in the post-Soviet Muslim-majority Central Asia? More specifically, to what extent 
does the variation in Islam (personal religiosity) and political Islam (support for Islam’s 
role in politics) help predict the propensity to engage in elite-challenging collective 
political actions, rooted in self-assertive social capital? Grounded in emancipative social 
capital theory, this article embarks on an individual-level quantitative analysis to 
systematically examine the variation in self-assertive collective action in four Central 
Asian republics. This study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the empirical 
nexus between general religiosity (Islam), Islamism (Political Islam), and elite-challenging 
collective actions and offers new clues on the empirical interactions between resurgent 
Islam and collective political participation in the post-Communist Muslim world. 
 








Vibrant civil society, active citizen participation, and social capital have long 
been viewed as vital for a healthy and robust democracy (Almond and Verba 
1963, Putnam 2000). To many, the Islamic world represents an antithesis to these 
notions. The lesser known corner of the Muslim-majority areas, which were under 
the Soviet domination during much of the last century, seem to provide an ideal 
type of authoritarianism and social apathy aggravated by the state communist 
experience. Indeed, the Soviet Central Asian region that has preserved clan- 
based clientelistic networks, exhibits elite-controlled societies that voted over-
whelmingly for the preservation of the USSR, and tolerated (ex-) communist 
leadership well into independence. While having a brief spike in civil action in the 
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last years of the Soviet rule and the early post-communist period (Beissinger 2002, 
Cichock 2003:262), it is common wisdom that the currently depressed status of the 
region's civil society leaves much to be desired. However, there are several 
examples which underline the potential for development of a vibrant civil society 
and social capital mobilized for collective public good in the region. Memories of 
the historical Basmachi movement that slowed down the Soviet advance in the 
region; Moscow's ensuing suspicion that the region is explosive and unreliable; the 
Jeldoqsan protests in Alma-Ata, which forebore the end of the Soviet Union; two 
Tulip Revolutions in Kyrgyzstan; the protest alliance of “seemingly antithetical 
political forces”, which included “pro-democracy movement” active in Dushanbe, 
religious forces, and supporters of an ex-communist leader, Nabiyev, in Tajikistan 
in opposition to the governing communist nomenklatura (Olcott 2005:45–46); and 
the active dissident diaspora are some of the examples, which underline the 
potential for development of a vibrant civil society and social capital mobilized for 
collective public good in the region. In this paper, we are using the cases of four 
Central Asian Republics (CARs) to examine our central question which addresses 
the influence of Islam on the formation of emancipative social capital, or self-
assertive collective participation in mass political action. This question has 
relevance beyond the Central Asian region, both for the larger Islamic world and 
the areas where Muslims form significant minority populations. 
By building on Welzel et al.’s (2005) frame of emancipative social capital 
theory, this study probes the following questions: To what extent does variation in 
attachments to spiritual Islam (as a way of life), as well as politically motivated 
Islamism, help explain the likelihood of elite-challenging collective protests? To 
examine the extent to which the dynamics of self-assertive publics can be 
explained by variation in attachments to Islam and Islamism, this study embarks 
on a quantitative analysis of elite-challenging actions in four Muslim-majority 
Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
These cases will provide a stringent test of the relationship between Islamic 
resurgence and emancipative social capital as both, though not inherently related 
and often deemed to be a contradiction in terms, are harshly suppressed in much of 
the region. Yet, due to their historical prominence and current socio-political 
centrality in the region, we suspect their presence and hypothesize an explicit 
relationship between them. 
In the first part of the paper, we engage in the discussion of the social capital 
literature, with an emphasis on emancipative social capital, and survey major 
factors responsible for the formation of collective action. Drawing on the extant 
literature, we then theorize about the relationship between Islam and emancipatory 
social capital in the context of the post-Soviet Muslim-majority Central Asia. We 









2. Emancipative social capital and collective action 
 
The theories of social capital have been subjected to a great deal of empirical 
scrutiny in the last two decades (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1990, Lin 2001, Putnam 
2002, Putnam et al. 1993). Scholars have extensively explored the variation of 
social capital to explain a myriad of social and political puzzles (Casanova 2001, 
Fukuyama 2001, Radnitz, Wheatley, and Zurcher 2009). Regardless of how social 
capital has been defined or measured in the literature, scholars largely agree that 
social capital has emerged as an inseparable component of democratization 
(Fukuyama 2001). Most commonly, democracy without active citizen participa-
tion, faith in democratic institutions, and vibrant civil society is viewed as more of 
an empty concept without substance that mainly characterizes authoritarian 
regimes (Dahl 1971). Direct collective action is a distinct and influential form of 
political participation (Author 2013). In this context, social capital is not only 
important for providing social bonding (which connects individuals to pursue 
collective goals), but is also regarded as an instrumental tool to direct communities 
toward active participation in democracy building (Krishna 2002, Putnam 1995). 
In this respect, social capital is often cited to have an influence on political 
participation (Krishna 2002). Whether citizens are actively involved in politics or 
“are alienated and cynical nonparticipants, depends entirely, in this view, on the 
available level of social capital” (Krishna 2002:439).  
Although it is one of the most widely studied concepts in comparative 
democratization literature (Ciftci 2010, Putnam 2002, Putnam, et al. 1993), social 
capital is a slippery concept. As Onyx and Bullen (2000) point out, it is slippery 
“because it has been poorly defined, important because it refers to the basic raw 
material of civil society” (p. 24). In general terms, social capital’s popularity in 
empirical research is its explanatory strength to answer the most basic question in 
socio-political research: “what keeps societies together and leads individuals to act 
for collective goals” (Welzel et al. 2005:122).  
It is widely held that social capital cannot be generated by individuals acting 
only by themselves in isolation from others (Leonard and Onyx 2003). The 
development of social capital often relies on active engagement of citizens work-
ing collectively within a participative community (Leonard and Onyx 2003). In 
this study, drawing from Welzel et al. (2005), we situate collective political 
actions within the framework of emancipative social capital theory. 1 Most 
commonly, an empirical operationalization of social capital is predominately 
based on institutional memberships. To conceptualize emancipative (or self-
assertive) social capital, we rely on Welzel et al.’s (2005) definition of citizens’ 
elite-challenging actions as a key determinant of self-assertive (emancipative) 
                                                     
1 By drawing from Weizal et al.’s (2005) conceptualization of emancipative social capital 
measured by three elite-challenging actions asked by the World Values Survey project.    
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social capital that produces collective actions through which individuals pursue 
their goals in society through non-violent means.2 
 
2.1. Explaining collective action 
Multiple theories compete to explain collective mass-protest actions in politics. 
The Political Opportunity Structure theory, for instance, emphasizes institutional 
structures and political processes that influence the level and scale of political 
activities. This approach focuses of “the influence of political institutions” of the 
state (Tatari 2009:278), or “key regime characteristics – such as whether it is a 
unitary or federal polity; the type of electoral system; the separation of powers 
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; and the 
position of key political elites” (Fetzer and Soper 2005:10–11). Yet, “such institu-
tional factors as the electoral system and the legal balance of the presidential/ 
parliamentary powers may be much less relevant in undemocratic settings” and it 
has been argued that “regime type is key to understanding other political and 
social outcomes in the post-communist context in light of vast variations in the 
regime type in the [post-communist] region” (Shaykhutdinov 2013:652). In 
democratic societies, which generally tolerate and accommodate protest behavior, 
individuals are more likely to engage in peaceful political actions without fear of 
reprisal (Foweraker and Landman 1997, Rootes 2003, Tarrow 1998). Given that 
virtually all CARs have been authoritarian, with inappreciable differences in civil 
liberties and political rights, this theory can do little to explain why Central Asians 
would embark on collective protests. Alternatively, one might suggest that 
insignificant differences in political opportunity structures may lead to vast 
differences in outcomes.  
In contrast, some subscribe to a third view, which is best represented by the 
grievances approach where the lack of available political channels (opportunity) 
for citizens to express criticism via mass demonstrations due to the closed nature 
of some political systems are more likely to motivate individuals to seek uncon-
ventional extra-institutional elite-challenging actions (Brockett 1991, Hafez 2003, 
Kitschelt 1986). In this perspective, nations with low levels of civil and political 
liberties offer no or limited platforms for citizens to seek their political interests 
through legal state institutions. This increases the levels of dissatisfaction and thus 
stimulates unauthorized protests. This proposition may apply to the Central Asian 
context and is tested for its explanatory strength in this paper.  
The grievance approach is not limited to an inability to express anger and 
discontent via institutional political channels. The proponents of this approach 
                                                     
2 Actions that are not sought within a broadly defined framework (e.g., violent protests) are 
discounted. On the premise that “[t]he future of Muslim politics is likely to belong to those 
who can speak to Muslim values and ethics, but within the framework of political platforms fit 
to thrive in democratic settings” (Nasr, 2005:20), we attempt to probe Islam and emancipative 
social capital by adopting Nasr’s framework that highlights Muslim participation within 
existing state statues and the rule of law. In other words, violent elite-challenging actions fall 
outside the scope of our analysis. 




would also argue that another major motivation in elite-challenging collective 
actions is the degree of socio-economic development, financial well-being, and 
behavior of the state. According to Ted Gurr’s prominent theory of “relative depri-
vation,” social and economic inequality, poverty, oppression, regime exploitation 
and other negative living conditions provide fertile ground for mass protests (Gurr 
1968, Gurr 1970). In a similar vein, Goodwin argues that revolutions arise largely 
due to political repression and violence (Goodwin 2001). In this theoretical camp, 
individual motivations that stem from various social and political contexts, rather 
than “opportunity structures,” play a much bigger role in stimulating protest 
behavior. Scholars of Central Asian politics have used this approach to account for 
a number of social and political puzzles. In this respect, controlling for the effects 
of grievances is essential.  
The resource mobilization thesis also offers compelling explanations for 
collective action. This thesis states that the extent of available resources is central 
in mobilizing and, more importantly, sustaining collective protests (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977). NGOs and various civil society groups often play highly instrumental 
roles in communicating salient issues to the public through their extensive 
voluntary networks by organizing mass protests. They also sustain the momentum 
of collective actions through a dedicated voluntary spirit. In this respect, an 
“affluent society, a highly skilled public and citizens freely engaging in voluntary 
associations create a resource environment that can support collective action” 
(Dalton et al 2010:4). Others have argued that such resources also include 
“effective organizational structures, wealth channeled to these organizations to 
further the political agendas of the group, and a successful leadership with 
knowledge of the political system of the host country” (Tatari 2009:278). Indeed, 
analyzing the World Values Survey data at both macro and micro levels, Dalton et 
al. (2010) find that resources, such as education and social group memberships, are 
strong and significant predictors of protests (Dalton et. al 2010). Not surprisingly, 
citizens with political skills and resources often spearhead, if not dominate, the 
discourse of collective action by effectively justifying the cause and the need for 
sustained elite-challenging actions.   
As a central resource, the level of education is often viewed as a leading factor 
that motivates collective political protests (Dalton et al 2010). Education equips 
citizens with an ability to internalize the tactical significance of nonviolence; it 
enhances communication skills, cultivates democratic values such as tolerance, 
and helps develop distinct interests within the social movement that reject political 
violence. Conversely, groups and individuals  exhibiting lower educational status 
are inclined to deploy more violent means for expressing political demands as lack 
of education prevents them from nurturing nonviolent discipline and developing 
collective interests and the norms of tolerance (Shaykhutdinov 2011). Our 
expectation, therefore, is that the most peaceful movements will be those that 
emphasize educational attainment among their members. Such groups have the 
advantage of comprehending, organizing and maintaining nonviolent protests that 
lack the animosity and distrust associated with violent conflict.  
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In fact, there is much theoretical argumentation that better educated individuals 
are inclined to use nonviolent strategies. Many theorists agree that education 
fosters the ‘culture of democracy’ and commitment to civil liberties among various 
political actors (Hyman and Wright 1979, Kohn 1969, Lipset 1959, McCloskey 
and Brill 1983, Nunn et al. 1978, Stouffer 1955). Education also broadens human 
horizons and “enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance” (Lipset 
1959:79). Moreover, education provides individuals with the skills to make 
rational choices; it also “restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic 
doctrines” (Lipset 1981:39). Consequently, people with a higher degree of school-
ing are inclined to be tolerant of others’ actions (Hall et al. 1986:565) and less 
supportive of violent protests (Hall et al. 1986). 
 
2.2. Islam vs. Islamism in collective action 
Religious affiliation can be categorized as a resource mobilized to connect 
individuals sharing the same faith and help nurture a fertile ground for collective 
action. We, however, distinguish between two very different mechanisms of 
religion (i.e. Islam), through which such mobilization occurs: Islam vs. Islamism. 
By Islam, we refer to the general spiritual piety of individuals embodied as a way 
of life. Political Islam or Islamism, at the most general level, can be broadly 
defined as “a body of faith” that “has something important to say about how 
politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslims world and 
implemented in some fashion” (Fuller 2004:xi). In other words, Islamism is “a 
form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that 
pursue political objectives,” which “provides political responses to today’s societal 
challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, 
reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic traditions” (Denoeux 2002:61).  
The inclusion and participation of Islamists in politics has been argued as a 
necessary condition in moderating Islamists (Hafez 2003, Achilov and Shaykhut-
dinov 2012).3 For example, providing the opportunities for Islamists to engage in 
tactical moderation by participating in democratic process has been theorized to 
result in ideological moderation (Karakaya and Yildirim 2012). Further, question-
ing whether military suppression of political Islam has ever worked, Cole (2013) 
argues that “long term attempts to limit political expressions of religion in modern 
history [...] is a mixed bag [as] it doesn’t work in the long run” at least in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Cole 2013). In essence, bringing Islamists to the 
political arena and offering them venues for self-expression are seen as ways of 
steering them away from the underground institutionalization and radicalized 
networks and more toward pragmatism and political compromise. 
There is a wide variety of opinions about the role of Islam in political and 
social life among religious Muslims, with Islamism being a political expression of 
                                                     
3 While a body of literature has engaged the compatibility, coexistence, and empirical relation-
ship between Islam, democracy, and participatory civil society in general, very limited 
research exists that systematically examines the effects of religious resurgence on collective 
protesting – an important dimension of self-assertive emancipative social capital (ESC). 




Islam (Ayoob 2008). Scholars have long considered the relationship between 
religion as a private, non-governmental enterprise on the one hand and social 
capital on the other (Achilov 2013). For instance, social capital is often cited as an 
important by-product of religion, tradition, shared historical experience and other 
social “factors that lie outside the control of any government” (Fukuyama 
2001:17) or the political ideology of Islamism. In the last two decades, the studies 
analyzing Islam, civil society, democratization, and the interactions thereof have 
received a great deal of scholarly attention. In this respect, employing individual-
level survey data on Muslim attitudes is swiftly becoming a leading empirical tool 
for understanding the highly complex composition of Muslim societies and 
polities, which “offer strong evidence that judgments pertaining to political 
circumstances and performance do make a difference” (Jamal and Tessler 
2008:108) with a possibility of having a productive “Muslim politics without an 
“Islamic” state” (Kuru 2013). 
On the contrary, some scholars have argued that Islam is “exceptional” and 
“uniquely resistant” and questioned Islam’s compatibility with liberal democratic 
norms (Fish 2002, Huntington 1996). Despite the claims of Islam’s inherent 
incompatibility with democracy and a possible clash of civilizations between the 
West and the Muslim world, the evidence from empirical analyses has revealed 
that democracy has an overwhelmingly positive image in the Islamic world 
(Inglehart 2007, Norris and Inglehart 2002). For instance, according to Inglehart 
(2007:42): 
In response to the item “Democracy may have many problems but it is better 
than any other form of government,” 61 per cent of the publics of the five Arab 
countries agreed strongly – a figure higher than 52 per cent registered in 16 
Western European countries or the 38 per cent strong agreement in the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand…. Clearly, the publics of Arab 
countries (and Islamic societies in general) do not reject democracy: over-
whelmingly majorities want it. 
The findings from survey data analyses have consistently illustrated that 
popular support for democracy is remarkably high in the Muslim world. For 
instance, Esposito and Mogahed’s (2008) study finds that “Muslims see no contra-
diction between democratic values and religious principles” (Esposito and 
Mogahed 2008:63). Further, the studies on Muslim attitudes in the Arab world 
(Jamal and Tessler 2008), Africa (Bratton 2003), Central Asia (Rose 2002), and 
non-Arab Muslim states (Hofmann 2004) have yielded decidedly similar results 
that Islam and democracy are not inherently incompatible and that Islam neither 
fosters antidemocratic attitudes nor diminishes support for democracy (Inglehart 
and Norris 2011). 
By applying a civil society argument to the Muslim world, Cavatorta (2006) 
highlights three factors illustrating that Islamist networks are a potential force for, 
not a barrier to, democratization: (1) Islamic civil society movements are capable 
of political learning; (2) they generate secular civil society activism as a response 
to their activities, increasing the number of actors in the political and social 
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systems; and finally (3), they can cooperate with other civil society groups on a 
variety of issues, provided that they are all subject to the same autocratic rule 
(Cavatorta 2006). Given this propensity for Islamic actors to support a democratic 
civil society, it is theoretically plausible to expect that Islam may be positively 
positioned to motivate citizens to participate in elite-challenging actions which 
promote emancipative social capital.  
 
H1: A higher level of attachments to Islam (spiritual piety) is positively 
associated with higher levels of elite-challenging collective actions and, thus, pro-
motes emancipative social capital. 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that political Islamist groups and networks 
have emerged as an important oppositional force against incumbent secular 
regimes. According to Gerges,  
In the last four decades, centrist Islamists skillfully positioned themselves as the 
credible alternative to the failed secular authoritarian order[...] They invested 
considerable capital in building social networks on the national and local 
levels, including non-government professional civil society associations, welfare 
organizations, and family ties (Gerges 2013:390).  
Although political Islamic networks are not tolerated by CARs, it might be 
plausible to expect citizens who support political Islam to pursue oppositional 
elite-challenging actions. Interestingly, the mainstream Islamists have been 
recently noted as important political actors who can “both reassure liberals and 
challenge Salafis from a position of strength” through a “discourse that is based on 
democratic freedoms but does not compromise Muslim values”, and engage in 
generating emancipative social capital (Kuru 2013:8). Thus, “Islamist parties are 
slowly moving away from their traditional agenda of establishing an authoritarian 
Islamic state and imposing Islamic law, to a new focus that is centered on creating 
a ‘civil Islam’ that permeates society and accepts political pluralism” (Gerges 
2013:391). Since such parties have been recently lauded for the attempts to 
peacefully challenge authoritarian regimes and adhere to nonviolent protests, we 
introduce the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Support for political Islam is positively associated with higher levels of 
elite-challenging collective actions, and, thus, promotes emancipative social 
capital. 
 
While the inclusion of Islamists in the political system is seen as an effective 
moderating tool that may ensure stability, many cast doubt on whether adherents 
to political Islam are capable of contributing to nonviolent and pro-democratic 
elite-challenging actions. While there is little doubt that Islamists – the advocates 
of political Islam – have emerged as the most significant non-state political actors 
throughout the Muslim world, they vary with respect to norms, goals, and tactics 
they employ in reaching their social or political ends (Schwedler 2011). Some 
observers, and especially the governments of CARs, Russia, and China, find it 
difficult to distinguish between the adherents of moderate movements and 
politically-radical Islamists. In their eyes, sympathizers of “Centrist Islamist 




parties like Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt [which] are 
slowly travelling down a similar path toward pluralism and parliamentarianism 
already traversed by the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah in Indonesia” 
(Gerges 2013:391) are not likely to be that different from a “minority” of “the 
Salafis and Islamic ultraconservatives in general” (Gerges 2013:389, emphasis 
added). 
The argument of relative economic deprivation is also put to test. Specifically, 
we probe the likelihood that Central Asians who indicate economic distress 
partake in collective political protests in the framework of the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: High economic grievances are likely to trigger elite-challenging collective 
actions. 
 
As argued above, resources at the avail of the groups are likely to condition the 
way in which religiosity influences collective action. A primary resource that 
individuals and groups can draw on and is difficult to withdraw once it is attained, 
is education. Consequently, we also test the resource mobilization theory focusing 
specifically on education. We particularly question how the level of individuals’ 
adherence to Islamic religious practices interacts with the degree of education in 
forming public-good-generating collective action. We hypothesize that individuals 
and groups with higher educational status are more likely to favor the use of 
peaceful tactics such as boycotts and demonstrations. Such attitudes are likely to 
be augmented with the increased levels of religiosity among Islamic publics. 
Among predominantly Islamic groups that have chosen to employ violent means 
of political claim making, there are notable examples of collectivities that exhibit 
lower levels of secular educational attainment than the dominant groups in the 
country. The case of the Taliban in Afghanistan is one example. In contrast, a 
number of groups that enjoy levels of education equitable with that of the 
dominant ethnic groups, such as the Muslim Tatars in Russia, have used non-
violent strategies of political protest (Shaykhutdinov 2010). 
In summary, our theoretical expectation is that the better educated individuals 
will tend to employ nonviolent strategies in their political pursuits. Education is 
likely to cultivate the values of tolerance, decrease the costs of social interaction 
and establish distinct strata within ethnic movements which favor nonviolent 
political strategies. The following is the main educational hypothesis that we 
investigate: 
 
H4: Education positively influences emancipative social capital. 
 
It is likely that the effects of religiosity and education on emancipative social 
capital are of a mutually reinforcing nature. Individuals exhibiting lower levels of 
both religiosity and education are likely to produce the lowest levels of 
emancipative capital. Those with a lower level of education but higher degree of 
religiosity or higher educational attainment but practicing religion infrequently 
may exhibit higher tendencies toward emancipative social capital than those who 
exhibit the minimal characteristics of both education and personal religiosity. 
Renat Shaykhutdinov and Dilshod Achilov 392
However, higher levels of education may unveil some alternative, non-dogmatic 
views and attitudes toward religion. Higher education may also provide a critical 
view of religious authorities, challenging politicization and instrumentalization of 
religion. In the last category, individuals who experienced greater exposure to 
education coupled with higher religiosity may also gain a broader understanding of 
the notion of public good that is not limited to the narrower primordial and 
communal interests. 
 
H5: Higher levels of religiosity conditioned by greater educational attainments 
positively influence the emancipative social capital. 
 
We also control for gender, age, and minority status of the respondents. It has 
been claimed that “[…] in practically all realms [...] women are less belligerent 
than men” (Page and Shapiro 295). Yet they are likely to be at odds with the status 
quo, as women generally show more liberal and left-leaning attitudes than men do 
in a number of policy areas. We, then, expect that women are more supportive 
participants of emancipative social capital formation than men are. 
 
H6: Women are more likely to engage in emancipative collective action than 
their male counterparts. 
 
Expecting that younger respondents have greater resources such as enthusiasm, 
time, health, and opportunities to engages in collective action, we hypothesize that 
 
H7: Younger respondents are likely to partake in emancipative social capital 
formation. 
 
As members of minority groups may face the type and depth of problems to 
which the majority population is not exposed, they are more likely to engage in 
collective action and be an active part of emancipative capital formation. 
 
H8: Minority group respondents are more active in emancipative social capital 
formation than members of the majority populations. 
 
 
3. Islam and collective action in cross-national context 
 
To probe the propositions and hypotheses developed in this study, we utilize 
aggregate and individual-level survey data from the Brookings Institution Conflict 
Prevention and Cooperation initiative in 2004 for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.4   
At the aggregate level, there is a clear variation in the instances of collective 
action across the countries in question. Of 1,500 surveys taken in each of the four 
CARs examined in this study, Kazakhstan had the lowest count of collective 
action instances, 119 (7.93%), while Tajikistan provided the highest, 631 
(42.07%) providing tentative support to the relative deprivation thesis. Since 
Kazakhstan  is  less  politically  repressive  and  significantly  wealthier  (Table  1),  
                                                     
4 For detailed descriptive statistics for all variables under investigation, see Appendix A. 




Table 1. Key indicators for civil liberties, political rights, and socio-economic conditions  
in Central Asia 
 
Socio-economic Indicators Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Religious freedom – (U.S. State Dept. 1992–
2000)1  
Moderate Moderate Low  Extremely  
Low 








Persecution of religious clerics/activists Low Low High High 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Access to worship (Muslims/Mosques ratio) 
(3,200:1) (3,010:1) (2,100:1) (16,000:1) 
Censorship of religious clerics Moderate Moderate High High 
Human Development Index (HDI)4 0.71 0.61 0.65 0.63 
Political rights (1-7, lower is freer)2 6/7 5/7 6/7 7/7 
Civil liberties (1-7, lower is freer)2 5/7 5/7 6/7 7/7 
Freedom of expression (0-16)2 7/16 10/16 6/16 1/16 
Rule of Law (percentile)3 15.6 26 11.8 9.5 
Control of corruption (percentile)3 11 21 10 14 
 
SOURCE:     
1 Derived from the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom reports from 1992–
  2000. Coded by the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA);  
2 Freedomhouse annual reports on political and civil liberties;  
3 The World Bank: Government Effectiveness;  
4 2005 Human Development Index (HDI) by the United Nations. 
 
 
Kazakhstanis might have had less incentive to protest and voice their 
grievances. The picture becomes more complex once the in-between cases are 
considered. Uzbekistan appears to have the second lowest number of protests, 323 
(21.53%), while Kyrgyzstan the second highest, 429 (28.60%), suggesting that 
political opportunity structures accorded by the regimes may also play a role in 
explaining protest behavior. The proportion of aggregate Muslim populations in 
each of the four cases seems to suggest some role for group resources in explain-
ing collective action. According to the most recent estimates by the CIA World 
Factbook, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have the lowest proportion of Muslim 
population among the CAR, 70.2% and 75%, respectively, while those in 
Uzbekistan (88%) and Tajikistan (90%) are among the highest. These proportions 
correspond on the ordinal level with the amounts of collective protest action across 
the CARs. However, at the higher levels of measurement (interval/ratio) this 
explanation is weakened. While Kazakhstan and Tajikistan clearly stand out as the 
extremes on the CAR protest behavior continuum, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
come very close to each other in the middle of the scale. 
Yet how do the main explanatory variables of interest, the level of religiosity 
on the one hand and political Islam on the other, account for this variation in 
collective political behavior at the country level? We measure the level of general 
religiosity, or attachments to Islamic way of life, by the frequency of daily prayers 
(i.e. Namaz). Political Islam, or Islamism, is gauged by individual attitudes that 
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support the role of Islam in political life (What should be the role of Islam in 
political life?).5 Cross-case variation in the levels of both personal religiosity 
(Islam) and political Islam in the context of four CARs points to an appreciable 
difference between Islamic values as individual religiosity and the attitudes toward 
Islam’s role in political life.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, given its long secular tradition, Kazakhstan stands out 
with a population expressing lowest levels of public support for political Islam; 
surprisingly, Kazakhstanis are second in personal religiosity in CAR. Tajikistan, 
on the other hand, places high in both categories suggesting that Tajik citizens are 
more religious and manifest significantly high support for Islamism in comparison 
to other Central Asians. While there are insignificant differences in personal 
religiosity levels between Uzbekistan (lower) and the Kyrgyz Republic (higher), 
Uzbeks appear to view Islam’s role in politics slightly higher than do their Kyrgyz 
neighbors. While both personal Islam and political Islamism seem to explain 
cross-country variation in collective action, we also analyze more nuanced 
individual-level data to account for these competing theories. 
 
 
4. Data and methods 
 
4.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, emancipative social capital, or self-assertive collective 
action, is measured using a 0-100 scale derived from the following four elite-
challenging collective actions: 
1. Did you sign any collective petition to the national or local authorities in 
the past three years? 
2. Did you organize people in your district/village to resolve any issue in the 
past three years? 
3. Did you take part in an authorized protest (meetings, strikes, pickets) in 
the past three years? 
4. Did you take part in an unauthorized protest (meetings, strikes, pickets) in 
the past three years? 
In constructing the dependent variable we accounted for two major factors, the 
level or risk embedded in taking a certain course of action and the diversity of 
protest actions employed by each respondent. In regard to the risk factor, we deem 
signing collective petitions to the authorities as the least risky way to express one's 
demands (1); taking part in legalized demonstrations is somewhat riskier (2), but 
not as dangerous as taking part in an illegal demonstration or organize people for a 
mass protest (3). We also consider the relative normative weights of protest types 
in formulating the dependent variable.6   
                                                     
5 For technical details for variable operationalization, see Appendix A. 
6 The weighted DV is aggregated as follows: DV_weighted = (q14b_sign_collective_petition*1) 
+ (q14e_partake_legal_demonstrations*2) + (q14c_organize_people_for_coll_action*3) + 
(q4f14f_partake_partake_illegal_demonstrations*3) 




To facilitate interpretation of the results the measure was re-scaled on a 
continuum from 0 to 100, where a score of 100 indicates that a survey respondent 
had signed a petition, mobilized people to resolve issues, and attended both 
authorized and unauthorized demonstrations or protest marches. A ‘0’ is assigned 
to those with no previous history of participation in any of the four types of 
collective political action. 
 
4.2. Independent variables 
Islam (spiritual piety) is measured using a 0-6 scale of individual survey 
respondents’ number of daily prayers. The maximum score of 6 (high religiosity) 
is assigned to those who pray five times a day or more; the minimal score of 0 is 
assigned to respondents indicating that they do not pray at all (No/Low 
religiosity).7 Political Islam is gauged through normative attitudes toward the 
importance of Islam’s role in politics. Respondents attributing a “Very important 
role” to Islam in politics are assigned a score of 4; those deeming that Islam 
should play a “Somewhat important role” are coded 3; a 2 is assigned to those who 
think that Islam should have “A small role” in politics; a 1 reflects the attitudes of 
“No role at all” for Islam in political life of the country. Financial satisfaction is 
captured by a 4-point scale of a survey respondent’s financial satisfaction of 
household income level. Respondent's gender is reflected by a dichotomous 
variable, Female. Variable Age represents respondents’ reported age (18+). Educa-
tion is a 5-point scale of the survey respondents’ education level (“incomplete 
secondary school or less” = 1; “complete higher education, master’s degree or 
greater” = 5). Minority status is a dichotomous variable that controls for ethnicity. 
Further detail on variable coding, and descriptive statistics are available in 
Appendix A. 
We begin with a descriptive analysis by systematically comparing and contrast-
ing associational patterns followed by a multivariate analysis to examine the 
empirical relationship between Islam and collective political action in four Central 
Asian states.  
 
 
5. Statistical analysis and results 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the scale of collective action across the four republics under 
consideration. Among them Tajikistan has the highest and Kazakhstan the lowest 
mean score on the collective action index. From the linear confidence of fit plot in 
Figure 1, it is readily observable that religiosity clearly stands out with a positive 
and systematically increasing association with respect to the level of collective 
actions. This trend is particularly evident in the case of Tajikistan. The residents of 
Kazakhstan,   known  for  its  predominately  secularized  social  fabric,   show  the  
                                                     
7 In addition, a dichotomous high religiosity variable was obtained by transforming newly 
constructed religiosity scales of 2-3 into “0” and 4-5 into “1.” 
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Figure 1. Confidence of fit plot for collective action and spiritual Islam. 
 
 
lowest likelihood of engaging in collective action in the region. This is true even 
for the most religious Kazakhstanis. Overall, in light of this largely positive 
bivariate association between religiosity and collective action, one may draw 
initial insights about the propensity of Central Asian publics with higher levels of 
personal religiosity to participate in elite-challenging actions.  
While descriptive-associational patterns provide important insights, a more 
nuanced analysis is necessary to better understand the overall effects of Islam and 
political Islam on contentious political attitudes while accounting for other con-
founding factors.  
Given the hierarchical structure of the survey data, consisting of individual and 
state levels, a potential fit of our theoretical model to the Hierarchical Linear 
Model (HLM) was tested. Specifically, an analysis of variance of the collective 
action was conducted to compare the country-level variance and the individual-
level variance. Applying this approach to an intercept only model, an intra-class 
correlation (ICC) coefficient was calculated as 0.103. With this in mind, we can 
conclude that only 10% of the total variance of the random effects is attributed to 
the second-level (i.e., country level). A high ICC value implies that most of the 
differences in the dependent variable are due to group differences while a small 
ICC indicates that the variance in the dependent variable stems from individual 




differences within groups (Snijders & Bosker 2012). In other words, when the 
percentage for random effects at the second-level is very small, then the random 
effects are hardly present. Moreover, there are only four states from the same 
region with comparatively low variability among macro-level factors. Con-
sequently, HLM is not necessary for the empirical analysis. Therefore, we utilize 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as a primary statistical tool of analysis as it enables 
the assessment of both the direction and strength of the influence that independent 
variables situated at various levels of analysis exert on the outcome variable in our 
model.8 We estimate the following model (Table 2): 
 
Y = α + β1x1 + β2x2 …… βkxk  + ε, 
 
where the effects of k independent variables are estimated on the outcome variable 
Y (Collective Actions).  
All other factor being equal, the effects of general religiosity (Islam) on 
participation in elite-challenging collective actions are positive and statistically 
significant across all models (1–4). Although the substantive effect of Islam is  
 
 
Table 2. OLS Estimates for collective action 
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Islam     
 1.470*** 1.569*** 1.367*** 0.667* 
 
Islam (religiosity) 
0.145 0.145 0.150 0.346 
 –0.148 0.041 0.078 0.043 
 
Political Islam 
0.289 0.288 0.288 0.288 
Deprivation, Resources, 
Volunteerism     
  –2.799*** –2.732*** –2.713*** 
 
Financial (household 
income) satisfaction   0.455 0.461 0.461 
  1.318*** 1.345*** 0.948*** 
 
Education level 
 0.236 0.236 0.295 
Socio-demographic Controls     
   0.097*** 0.102*** 
 
Age 
  0.020 0.020 
   –1.662** –1.598*** 
 
Gender (Female) 
  0.567 0.567 
   –1.131* –1.103* 
 
Minority status 
  0.642 0.642 
Interaction terms     
 Islam and education     0.259** 
     0.115 
 10.295*** 13.640*** 12.675*** 13.575*** 
 Constant 0.769 1.555 2.077 2.115 
 Adjusted R2 0.023 0.037 0.044 0.044 
  N 4356 4357 4357 4357 
                                                     
8 In addition to OLS, binomial logit and ordered logit procedures were employed. The results 
obtained through OLS were robust to these methodological checks. 
Renat Shaykhutdinov and Dilshod Achilov 398
relatively small, the finding suggests that more religious citizens are more likely to 
engage in non-violent collective actions against incumbent regimes, on average, 
which lends support for Hypothesis 1. Said otherwise, a higher level of attach-
ments to spiritual piety is positively associated with higher levels of elite-challeng-
ing collective actions, which, in turn, promotes emancipative social capital. 
There is insufficient evidence across the four models for political Islam, on the 
other hand, to explain the propensity toward engaging in elite-challenging 
collective actions. Therefore, the evidence does not support the second hypothesis 
that individuals who attach high importance to political Islam are associated with 
greater levels of collective political actions in Central Asia. In part, these findings 
support the conventional thinking that support for Islamism is often associated 
with mistrust and suspicions toward state institutions (Denoeux 2002).  
Perhaps not surprisingly, given Central Asia’s lackluster economic conditions 
(with the exception of Kazakhstan), economic relative deprivation strongly 
predicts the level of collective actions (models 2–4); individuals with relatively 
higher economic satisfaction appear to be less likely to embark on collective 
protests whereas those who rate their financial conditions unfavorably are more so, 
on average (p < 0.01). It is noteworthy that economic conditions are found to 
highly matter in this context, a finding which supports Hypothesis 3: as financial 
satisfaction decreases, many more incentives emerge for citizens to seek action by 
petitioning to state authorities.  
The impact of education stands out, ceteris paribus, with statistically significant 
and substantively large net-effects (p < 0.01). As expected, individuals with higher 
educational credentials are more likely to pursue collective political actions com-
pared with those who do not. Intuitively, this finding highlights the importance of 
intellectual human capital as a key resource which in turn may be playing an 
important role in collective political mobilization. Moreover, the interaction between 
religiosity and education (model 4) is also statistically relevant in explaining 
collective protests. That is, Muslims with higher levels of educational attainment and 
greater religiosity are more likely to mobilize and pursue elite-challenging collective 
actions than those with lower values on these factors (p < 0.05). These findings 
provide empirical support for hypotheses 4 and 5, respectively.   
Non-titular ethnic minorities appear to be less likely to engage in collective 
political actions, as do women (Models 3 and 4). Although a more nuanced 
research is necessary in this regard, it is possible that ethnic minorities lack 
confidence and trust in a political system dominated by a titular nationality, where 
they find themselves socially marginalized and politically disenfranchised. They 
may simply feel apathetic towards a system that is unresponsive, at best, and 
punitive of dissent, at worst. Gender gap in participation in collective action also 
stands out; Central Asian women are less likely to be part of collective political 
actions than men are. In regard to age, older citizens appear to be more likely to be 
a part of collective protests compared to the young. With this mind, we find no 
support for hypotheses 6, 7, and 8. 




To put the influences of the variables discussed in the comparative perspective 
below we include the standardized effects of the statistically significant 





Figure 2. Standardized effects of statistically significant explanatory variables on collective action. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the scaled effects of statistically significant explanatory 
variables. The substantive effects of spiritual Islam stands out with the highest 
impact on emancipative social capital. Economic satisfaction, education, and age 
factors appear to share the impact level on collective action whereas the sub-





By engaging in an empirical analysis of Islam and its increasing role in shaping 
the rapidly changing social and political landscape of the Muslim-majority 
societies, this study offers new clues on the emerging interactions between Islam, 
Islamism and political activism in the lesser known corner of the Muslim-majority 
areas – the post-Soviet Central Asia. At the same time, the article provides one of 
the first attempts to empirically examine the extent of both spiritual Islam and 
political Islam’s propensity for engaging in self-assertive collective actions in the 
contexts of four Central Asian republics. In line with Hypothesis 1, the level of 
religiosity is positively associated with the tendency toward collective protest. 
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Support for political Islam, however, does not seem to explain the variation in 
collective action in Central Asia. While religious Muslims seem more likely to 
participate in collective protests, the evidence is scant to suggest that attitudinal 
support for the Islam’s role in political life translates into collective action. 
We also find support for the economic grievances thesis and the level of 
education, which appear to strongly predict the level of collective political protests 
in the Central Asian context. The effects of education on political action are 
augmented by greater religiosity of the respondents. A male and a person of a 
dominant ethnic group is more likely to engage in emancipative collective action. 
One of the specific implications offered by this study deals with its implicit 
challenge of the conception of Islam as a monolithic “black box,” for which a one-
size-fits-all approach should be employed. This study shows that personal 
religiosity is very different from an attitudinal support for political Islam, at least 
as far as the collective action is concerned. In fact, it is noteworthy that the 
empirical correlation between personal religiosity and favoritism of political Islam 
is rather mediocre, 0.188 (N = 6,000), for the Central Asian region as a whole. 
While there are questions concerning the nature of demands advanced in these 
protests in the region, it is clear that they do not directly call for a greater role of 
religion in public social and political life since those for whom this problem is 
important shy away from the protest behavior. Rather, numerous economic, 
environmental, and social issues associated with emancipative social capital are 
likely to be highlighted in the collective actions under study. It is important to 
emphasize that it is personal religiosity, and not support for Islamist political 
ambitions, which has a greater bearing on such actions. 
Consequently, one should be careful in categorizing the Islamic “peril” in the 
“broad church” terms and crafting “wide-brush” policy proposals for dealing with 
it. First, while support for greater visibility of Islam in public life is certainly 
present among Central Asia’s populations, it does not get carried out to the Central 
Asian street; certainly, not as often as many Central Asian governments portray it 
to be. Further, greater religiosity is associated with a higher propensity for quality-
of-life type of demands, which have little to do with public expression of religion. 
Thus, by suppressing political Islamists who tend to be personally non-religious, 
one would engage in solving a problem which is essentially miniscule or non-
existent. Such policies may, in fact, be at risk of radicalizing political Islamists, 
legitimize their demands, and push them to the street. On the other hand, policies 
designed to persecute those who are personally religious are likely to result in 
unintended consequence of suppressing emancipative social capital. This does not 
mean, however, that radical Islamists who justify violence should not be pro-
secuted if they engage in destructive actions (e.g. terrorism). Policy-makers, how-
ever, should be wise and nuanced in deciding how to allocate scarce tangible and 
intangible resources for attaining greater public good. 
In sum, the findings provide insightful explanations to better understand and 
contextualize the emerging dynamics of participatory civil society in the context of 
collective protest behavior of the post-Soviet Central Asia. While this study 




contributes to an understanding of the rising role of Islam on contentious politics, 
rooted in self-assertive emancipative social capital, it has also sought to advance 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX A 
 
A.1. Variable coding and operationalization 
 
Variable Source, coding and definition 
Age Actual age of respondents (18+). Q2: Age of respondent.  
Islam (religiosity) A scale of 1-6 of survey respondents’ on how often they pray:  Q93: How 
many times a day do you pray? (“Five times” =6, “Never” = 1).  
Political Islam A scale of 1-4 of survey respondents’ on how they view the role of Islam 
should be in political life:  Q91: What role do you think Islam should play 
in the political life of [country]? (“Very important role” =4, “Somewhat 
important role” = 3, “A small role” =2, “No role at all” = 1).  
Female Gender dummy: Q10: “Female” = 1, “Male” = 0.  
Minority status A dichotomous value of ethnic minority status. Q3p: Nationality of 




A 1-4 Likert-scale for financial satisfaction of household income: Q10: 
How do you estimate current economic situation of your household? 
(“Very good” = 4; “Very bad” =1). 
Education A 5-point scale of the survey respondent’s education level. Q5: Highest 
level of Education of respondent (“incomplete secondary school or less” = 






A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Collective Action 4306 .00 100.00 .44 17.928 
Islam (religiosity)  4453 .00 6.00 1.34 2.081 
Islam should play important role 5229 1.00 4.00 2.40 1.051 
Econ. conditions in household 5867 1.00 4.00 2.74 .630 
Age 6000 18.00 92.00 39.92 15.394 
Gender (female = 1) 6000 1.00 2.00 1.55 .497 
Minority 6000 .00 1.00 .32 .466 















A.3. State-level OLS estimates for collective action 
 
    Kazakhstan Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Uzbekistan Tajikistan 
Islam      
 0.272** 0.357** 0.199** 0.229** 
 
Islam (spiritual piety) 
0.081 0.153 0.096 0.102 
 –0.049 –0.136 –0.236 0.236 
 
Political Islam 
0.095 0.235 0.149 0.214 
Deprivation and resources     
 –0.405*** 0.289 –0.999*** –1.555*** 
 
Financial (income) satisfaction  
0.135 0.396 0.221 0.36 
 0.127* 0.679*** 0.056 0.491*** 
 
Education level 
0.069 0.204 0.128 0.167 
Socio-demographic controls     
 0.008*** 0.067*** 0.007 0.106*** 
 
Age 
0.006 0.017 0.009 0.015 
 –0.04 0.165 0.288 –2.073*** 
 
Gender (female) 
0.165 0.459 0.286 0.428 
 –0.082** –1.057** 0.389 –1.235*** 
 
Minority status 
0.174 0.497 0.348 0.51 
      
 1.182*** 0.144*** 4.935*** 7.699*** 
 
Constant 
0.612 1.709 1.034 1.578 
 Adjusted R2 0.014 0.021 0.021 0.075 
  N 1499 1453 1488 1415 
 
 
 
 
